Coordinating the Crowd: Inducing Desirable Equilibria in Non-Cooperative
  Systems by Mguni, David et al.
Coordinating the Crowd: Inducing Desirable Equilibria in
Non-Cooperative Systems
David Mguni
PROWLER.io
Cambridge, UK
davidmg@prowler.io
Joel Jennings
PROWLER.io
Cambridge, UK
joel@prowler.io
Sergio Valcarcel Macua
PROWLER.io
Cambridge, UK
sergio@prowler.io
Emilio Sison
Department of Mechanical
Engineering, MIT
Cambridge, MA, USA
esison@mit.edu
Sofia Ceppi
PROWLER.io
Cambridge, UK
sofia@prowler.io
Enrique Munoz de Cote
PROWLER.io
Cambridge, UK
enrique@prowler.io
ABSTRACT
Many real-world systems such as taxi systems, traffic networks
and smart grids involve self-interested actors that perform individ-
ual tasks in a shared environment. However, in such systems, the
self-interested behaviour of agents produces welfare inefficient and
globally suboptimal outcomes that are detrimental to all — some
common examples are congestion in traffic networks, demand spikes
for resources in electricity grids and over-extraction of environmental
resources such as fisheries. We propose an incentive-design method
which modifies agents’ rewards in non-cooperative multi-agent sys-
tems that results in independent, self-interested agents choosing
actions that produce optimal system outcomes in strategic settings.
Our framework combines multi-agent reinforcement learning to
simulate (real-world) agent behaviour and black-box optimisation
to determine the optimal modifications to the agents’ rewards or
incentives given some fixed budget that results in optimal system
performance. By modifying the reward functions and generating
agents’ equilibrium responses within a sequence of offline Markov
games, our method enables optimal incentive structures to be de-
termined offline through iterative updates of the reward functions
of a simulated game. Our theoretical results show that our method
converges to reward modifications that induce system optimality.
We demonstrate the applications of our framework by tackling a
challenging problem within economics that involves thousands of
selfish agents and tackle a traffic congestion problem.
1 INTRODUCTION
Complex systems such as traffic networks, smart grids and fleet
networks involve autonomous agents that each seek to perform
individual tasks. One such example is a ride-sharing network such as
an Uber fleet which involves many self-interested (freelance) drivers
that each use the same road network and have access to a common
supply of customers. Other examples are road traffic networks used
by commuters, electricity grids with households drawing from the
network and smart grids. In each of these settings, agents utilise a
shared resource to maximise their individual objectives.
Multi-agent systems (MASs) in which agents act non-cooperatively
to maximise their own interests are modelled by Markov game
(MGs). In MGs, although each agent acts rationally, that is, to max-
imise its own interests, the lack of coordination produces stable
outcomes or Nash equilibria (NE) that are vastly suboptimal from a
system perspective and undermine firm efficiency [7].
In the case of ride-sharing networks, drivers’ self-interested be-
haviour and their preference to locate at certain regions results in
inefficient clustering that produces a distribution of taxis that does
not match customer locations [16]. This results in a market ineffi-
ciency and prevents firms from maximising output. In electricity
networks, excessive demand at specific periods leads to demand
spikes that overwhelm electrical supply; in traffic networks the ac-
tions of self-interested commuters leads to heavy congestion and
traffic delays resulting in poor network outcomes.
To alleviate these problems, network designers can employ incen-
tives to modify the strategic behaviour of the self-interested agents.
However, in an MAS, these incentives must be carefully calibrated to
induce desirable outcomes from the joint behaviour of selfish actors
in dynamic environments and often, with (budgetary) constraints
on the size of incentives or penalties. Additionally, in settings such
as smart grids and traffic networks, the design of incentives must
also account for adjustments in the system state such as changes in
customer demand for taxis; consequently, designing incentives is a
formidable challenge [22].
Although in many MAS, the agents’ reward functions are known
(e.g. minimising commute time, firm profit maximisation) or a suf-
ficiently accurate proxy can be constructed from data, designing
incentives remains a challenge. This is due to the fact that changes
to the agents’ joint behaviour (and the resulting system outcomes)
after modifications to their rewards is generally difficult to predict.
In general, it is known that in many real-world MASs, human
strategic interaction approximates Nash equilibrium strategies. Multi-
agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is a powerful tool that enables
computerised agents to learn strategic behaviour after repeated in-
teractions in unknown systems - this enables MARL to serve as a
useful tool to generate a proxy of outcomes in systems with human
participants and simulate the behaviour of other computerised agents
[9]. As with algorithmic methods in game theory, MARL does not
offer a method of promoting efficient outcomes that maximise social
welfare (e.g. minimise travel time in traffic networks) or optimise
external objectives (e.g. maximise taxi firm efficiency) and typically
converge to poor system outcomes [25].
We propose a new technique to tackle the issue of undesirable
outcomes in MASs. In our framework, an incentive designer (ID)
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modifies agents’ reward functions in such a way that ensures conver-
gence to efficient outcomes. This modification, as shown in one of
our experiments, can represent a toll charge on a traffic network that
induces even traffic flow leading to reduced congestion.
Using the known agents’ intrinsic goals, our framework firstly
uses MARL to learn the NE of simulated MAS and thus generate
a proxy for real-world outcomes. This then allows us to model the
induced changes in agents’ behaviour given modifications to their
rewards through incentives. The ID uses Bayesian optimisation in
the simulated environment to determine the optimal modifications
to the agents’ rewards to be implemented in the real-world settings.
The ID is not required to have a priori knowledge of the system
performance metric but requires only the goal of the agents (e.g.
arriving at work in the quickest time possible).
We concern ourselves with Markov potential games (MPGs) —
a class of MGs that model settings in which agents compete for
a common resource such as selfish routing games (transportation
networks) [22], spectrum sharing (wireless communications) [32],
oligopoly [26], electric power grids [12] and cloud computing [3].
We prove theoretical results that demonstrate that within MPGs,
the ID’s modifications to the game produces a continuous family
of NE. Crucially, this allows the ID to use black-box optimisation
techniques to find the reward modifications that induce desirable
behaviour in the agents. Since the reward modifier influences the
potential function - a function that is maximised by all agents’ NE
strategies, the method can be used to induce the desired behaviour in
any number of agents. This is exemplified in one of our experiments
in which we successfully modify the rewards of 2,000 agents.
Contributions. i) We propose an algorithmic framework that
determines how to modify the rewards (i.e. find incentives) in an
MPG environment that lead to optimal system performance. ii) We
show that the set of MGs with modified rewards are MPGs, and that
the equilibrium set is continuous on the reward modifications. As we
show, this allows us to prove existence of an optimal reward modifier.
We prove convergence to the reward modifier that induces efficient
NE and provide an approximation bound when the optimal reward
modifier is estimated with a method that has low computational
complexity. iii) We illustrate the framework in a set of experiments
that tackle a logistic problem involving a system with 2,000 agents
and a traffic network problem within a subsection of London.
Related Work. Our work relates to mechanism design (MD) [19]
and its dynamic and learning variants [27]. These incomplete infor-
mation models analyse the problem of constructing a mechanism -
a system of rewards and transfers, among self-interested strategic
agents that have private information about their reward functions.
The problem is to incentivise truth-revealing announcements from
the agents. A well-known result in MD rules out (strategy-proof)
mechanisms that induce the desired agent behaviour for general
agent reward functions [23]. Therefore, in MD, agents’ reward func-
tions are (typically) limited to quasi-linear functions that are known
up front [19]. Our framework permits a general rewards beyond
quasi-linear functions.
This work relates to leader-follower games - sequential games in
which a leader moves in advance of other agent(s) or follower(s),
who each select a best response strategy [28]. However, in leader-
follower games, the leader cannot induce efficient outcomes i.e.
maximise its own objective (e.g. ex. 98.1 in [20]) since the leader’s
reward is a function over a fixed joint action set.
Our work also relates to reward shaping through which a reward
is added with the aim of inducing convergence to a more desirable
equilibrium [2]. The majority of the reward shaping literature is
concerned with potential based reward shaping. Potential based
reward shaping leaves the NE set unaltered and does not guarantee
convergence to more efficient equilibria [6]. A number of papers
handle non-potential based rewards shaping e.g. [21], however, such
papers are limited in scope since they consider only specific normal
form games settings e.g. the stag hunt game1. We tackle the MG
case which adds considerable complexity since it requires a method
of incentivising sequences of state-action pairs (trajectories) in a
stochastic environment.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Let N ≜ {1, . . . ,N } denote the (possibly infinite) set of agents
where N ∈ N × {∞}. An MG is a tuple:
G= ⟨N, (γi )i ∈N ,S, (Ui)i ∈N, P , (Ri )i ∈N⟩ which can be described
as follows: at each time step t = 1, 2, . . .T ∈ N × {∞}, the state of
the system is given by s ∈ S ⊆ Rp for some p ∈ N. The game is
equipped with an action set U= ×i ∈NUi – a Cartesian product of
each agent’s action set Ui . Each set Ui is a compact, non-empty
action set for each agent i ∈ N. We define by U−i = ×j ∈N\{i }Uj -
the Cartesian product of all agents’ action sets except agent i. At each
time step, the next state of the game is determined by a probability
distribution P : S× U× S so that P(·|s,u) gives the probability
distribution over next states given a current state s when the agents
take a joint action u ∈ U. When the environment is at state s and
the agents take action u, each agent i receives a reward computed by
a Lipschitz function Ri : S× Ui × U−i → R. The term γi ∈ [0, 1[
is each agent i’s discount factor. Each agent has a stochastic policy
π i : S× Ui → R+ - a conditional distribution over the action set
given the current state. Let Πi be a non-empty set of stochastic
policies over S× Ui such that π i ∈ Πi . We denote by Π the set
of policies for all agents i.e. Π ≜ ×i ∈NΠi , where each π i , and by
Π−i ≜ ×j ∈N\{i }Πj . For simplicity, we assume Πj = Πi ,∀i , j. The
joint policy of all agents is denoted by π =
(
π i
)
i ∈N ∈ Π, while the
joint policy of all but the i-th agent is denoted π−i =
(
π j
)
j ∈N\{i }.
We will sometimes write π =
(
π i ,π−i
)
for any i ∈ N.
Each agent i ∈ Nuses a value function, vπi : S× Π → R, as its
objective function:
vπi (s) = E
[ T∑
t=0
γ ti Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t )
ut ∼ π (·|st ),
st+1 ∼ P(·|st ,ut ), s0 = s
]
, (1)
where ut = (ui,t ,u−i,t ) is the joint action at time t . We now give
some essential definitions:
Definition 2.1. The policy π i ∈ Πi is a best-response policy
against π−i ∈ Π−i if: π i ∈ argmax
π˜ i ∈Πi
v
(π˜ i ,π −i )
i .
1In [21] some experiments on repeated games are performed but no theoretical analysis
is provided.
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A Markov-Nash equilibrium (M-NE) is the solution concept for
MGs in which every agent plays a best-response against other agents.
A M-NE is defined by the following:
Definition 2.2. A strategy π =
(
π i
)
i ∈N ∈ Π is an M-NE if
v
(π i ,π −i )
i (s) ≥ v
(π ′i ,π −i )
i (s), (2)
∀π ′i ∈ Π,∀π−i ∈ Π−i ,∀s ∈ S,∀i ∈ N.
The M-NE condition ensures no agent can improve their re-
wards by deviating unilaterally from their current strategy. We define
NE{G} as the set of M-NE for the game G.
Definition 2.3. An MG is called an exact MPG or an MPG for
short, if there exists a function Φ : S× Π → R such that:
v
(π i ,π −i )
i (s) −v
(π ′i ,π −i )
i (s) = Φ(π
i ,π −i )(s) − Φ(π ′i ,π −i )(s)
∀π ′i ∈ Πi , ∀π−i ∈ Π−i ,∀s ∈ S, ∀i ∈ N (3)
Note that Φπ (s) gives the same value for all agents. We use G(w)
to denote an MPG. In this paper, we focus exclusively on MPGs.
3 THE FRAMEWORK
We now describe how the ID modifies the MG played by the agents.
The problem is arranged into a hierarchy in which the ID chooses
the reward function of the game and a simulated subgame which
models the joint behaviour of the agents. The goal of the ID is
to modify the set of agent reward functions for the subgame that
induces behaviour that maximises the ID’s payoff. Crucially, in the
MAS model, the agents are required to behave rationally and hence
produce the responses of self-interested agents in an environment
with the given reward functions. Using feedback from the simulated
subgame in response to changes to the agents’ reward functions, the
ID can compute precisely the modifications to the agents’ rewards
that produce desirable equilibria among self-interested agents. The
simulated environment avoids the need for costly acquisition of
feedback data from real-world environments whilst ensuring the
generated agent behaviour is consistent with real-world outcomes.
The MAS model consists of solving the Markov game G(w) =
⟨N, (γi )i ∈N ,S, (Ui )i ∈N, P , (Ri,w )i ∈N⟩ i.e. finding π ∈ NE{ G(w)}
where the parameter w is chosen by the ID. Now each agent i ∈ N
has a value function vπ ,wi : S× Π ×W → R given by:
vπ ,wi (s) = E
[ T∑
t=0
γ ti Ri,w (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t )

ut ∼ π (·|st ), st+1 ∼ P(·|st ,ut ), s0 = s
]
The most natural alteration to an agent’s reward function is for it to be
modified additively by a modifier functionΘ : S×Ui×U−i×W →
R such that the agents’ modified reward function becomes:
Ri,w (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ) ≜ Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ) + Θ(st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
where Ri : S× Ui × U−i → R is an ‘intrinsic reward’ that cannot
be modified by the ID. This function describes the agents’ goals e.g.
minimising travel time in their commute. We assume a sufficiently
good proxy is available or the function is known to the ID. The
function Θ is a modification to each agent’s reward function and
represents an incentive - for example, it may represent a toll charge
in a traffic network or a surcharge in a smart grid which depends on
factors such as time of day and the predicted available supply.
Note that the modifier function includes cases for whichΘ(·,u−i,t , ) =
Θ(·,u ′−i,t ), ∀u−i,t , u ′−i,t ∈ U−i in which case the modifier func-
tion adds rewards that do not depend on actions other than those
taken by agent i.
We denote the cumulative sum of incentives by Ψ(w,π ) :=∑
i ∈N
∑T
t=0 Θ(st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
The incentive designer’s problem consists of a tuple PID ≜ ⟨w,RID⟩
where w ∈W ⊂ Rl (l ∈ N) is a set of vector of real-valued parame-
ters over a space of parametric uniformly continuous functions and
RID is the reward function for the ID. The ID’s problem is to find Θ
(i.e. the vector of parameters w) that maximises the following:
J (w,π ) := E[RID(w,π ) − λΨ(w,π )] , λ ∈ R (4)
whilst satisfying the M-NE condition which ensures that the agents
play best-response policies. Thus the ID’s problem is:
maximise
w ∈W
J (w,π ) s.t. v(π i ,π −i ),wi (s) ≥ v
(π ′i ,π −i ),w
i (s),
∀i ∈ N ,∀π ′i ∈ Πi ,∀π−i ∈ Π−i ,∀s ∈ S. (5)
where J is a Lipschitz continuous function. The formulation de-
scribes numerous problems within economics and logistics including
revenue management (e.g., ticket pricing), congestion management,
and network design problems (e.g. tolling) [5]. The function Ψ can
be interpreted as a system of wealth transfers for example, in the case
of freelance taxis, Ψ represents rewards given to drivers for taking
jobs at specific times and locations or surcharges to customers, and
similarly for smart grid users at peak times. The following condition
constrains the transfer of wealth to the set of agents:
Definition 3.1. We say that the ID’s choice of w ∈W is weakly
budget balanced, if there is no net transfer of wealth from the ID
to the agents: Ψ(w,π ) ≤ 0.
We consider two main types of reward function for the ID, de-
pending on the ID’s goal:
1. Trajectory targeted: The ID’s payoff is a function of the state
trajectories produced by the agents’ policies in the MG; i.e. is,
J (w,π ) ≜ E[RID(w,Xπ , ζ )] , where Xπ is Markov chain induced
by the policy profile π ∈ Π in G(w) and ζ is an i.i.d. random
variable which captures outcome noise. An example is taxi firm
seeking to match the location of a set of freelance taxi drivers with
(predicted) customer locations in some region. Here, the ID’s ob-
jective could be given by a KL divergence between the distribution
of taxis at every timestep, Dat (w,π ), and the target distribution of
demand, D⋆t : R
(tra)
ID =
∑T
t=0 KL(Dat (w,π )∥D⋆t ). Other applications
of trajectory targeted objectives are firms seeking to smoothen elec-
tricity consumption in smart grids through dynamic pricing [5] and
modification of firm activity through taxation [17].
2. Welfare targeted: The ID’s payoff is a function of the agents’
joint rewards, that is, J (w,π ) ≜ E[RID(w,h(vπ ,wu ), ζ )] , for some
uniformly continuous function h and vπ ,wa ≜
(
vπ ,wi
)
i ∈N. One ex-
ample a traffic network manager that seeks to minimise travel time
of all agents. In this cases, the ID is the sum of agents’ negative
costs (travel times) i.e.: R(soc)ID =
∑
i ∈Nvπ ,wi , which results in the
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ID maximising social welfare. Similar examples are resource extrac-
tion and oligopoly intervention e.g. fishery problems using optimal
taxation [26] in which the ID seeks to maximise firm welfare whilst
seeking to sustain a minimum amount of the resource and worst-case
optimisation (maxmin) problems (i.e. by setting h = −1).
The ID problem (5) is a bilevel optimisation problem (mathe-
matical program with equilibrium constraints). Such problems are
generally highly non-convex with unconnected feasible regions. For
this reason, the problem is generally highly intractable using analytic
methods but for simple cases (e.g. linear rewards) [4].
In the next section, we overcome these issues by expressing
the NE constraint in terms of the potential function, and show that
MARL methods can be applied to compute the set of NE for the
MAS model, so that we can ensure feasibility for the ID problem
without requiring closed analytic solutions. Crucially, this, as we
show, allows us to compute the agents equilibrium policies to an
MG the reward function of which, is chosen by the ID. We prove
continuity properties of the MPG with respect to the ID’s changes to
the reward function which allows the ID to produce an iterative se-
quence of reward functions. We then give a constructive formulation
that allows to prove convergence to such an optimal solution for the
ID. Finally, we provide an approximation bound when the optimal
reward modifier is approximated with a truncated power series. We
proceed to explain the details.
4 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
We now show that G(w) is an MPG, which enables NE{G(w)} to be
described in terms of local maxima of function (not fixed points).
PROPOSITION 4.1. There exists a function Φ : S× Π → R such
that each agent’s best-response strategy in G(w) maximises Φ.
Prop. 4.1 reduces the problem of finding the M-NE for G(w) to a
single optimal control problem as opposed to finding a fixed point
solution which is considerably more difficult. However, it is neces-
sary to show that the game produced after the ID alters the agents’
rewards is still potential. The following lemma establishes that fact:
LEMMA 4.2. The game G(w) is an MPG.
PROOF. To prove the assertion we need to show that the transfor-
mation Ri → Ri,w preserves the potential game property.
For any functionΞ : S×Ui×U−i define ∆Ξ ≜ Ξi,w (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t )−
Ξi,w (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ). We claim that there exists a function Φπ ,w (s)
s.th. ∆Ri,w (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ) = Φπ ,w (s). This follows directly from
the additive form of the reward function modification. Indeed, con-
sider the function Φπ ,w (s) ≜ Φπ (s) + Θ(s,ui ,u−i ,w)(s). Since G0
is potential, by (3) and (4) we have that:
∆Ri,w (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ) = ∆Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ) + ∆Θ(st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
= ∆Φπ ,w (s) (6)
which completes the proof. □
PROPOSITION 4.3. S.2 RID is uniformly continuous in w .
The proof of the proposition is deferred to the appendix.
COROLLARY 4.4. The following expression holds{
argmax
π ∈Π
Φπ ,w (s),∀s ∈ S
}
⊆ NE{G(w)}. (7)
Cor. 4.4 expresses that in playing their best-response strategies
G(w), each agent inadvertently maximises Φπ ,w , so the function
Φπ ,w is a potential of G(w).
Having reduced the problem of finding NE{G(w} to an optimal
control problem, we now establish that the ID’s problem is a con-
strained optimisation problem:
THEOREM 4.5. ID’s problem is equivalent to:
maximise
w ∈W ,π ∈Π
J (w,π ) s.t. ∇πΦπ ,w = 0, ∇2Φπ ,w ⪯ 0. (8)
SKETCH. The proof of the theorem consists of the following com-
ponents; proving that Φ ∈ C1 and that ID’s problem can be rewritten
as a constrained optimisation problem and the set of constraints of
the problem are expressed by (8). By Rademacher’s lemma we have
that if Φ is Lipschitz continuous on some open subset of its domain
then Φ is differentiable almost everywhere (in that set). Since the
Φ is defined over S ⊆ Rp , we can construct an open subset for
which Rademacher’s lemma holds. To deduce the remainder of the
theorem, we note that by Corollary 4.4, NE{G(w)} coincide with
the set of the local maxima of Φ. The result then follows by noting
that conditions (8) are first and second order conditions for local
maxima of the function Φ. □
Theorem 4.5 establishes that the ID’s problem reduces to a con-
strained optimisation problem where the feasibility set is given by
the set of points that are local maxima of Φ. In the next section, we
show that we can apply MARL to constrain the set of points inW
to lie within the feasibility set.
We now prove that NE{G(w)} is continuous on w — this enables
the ID to generate an iterative sequence of games and permits use
of black-box optimisation to solve the ID’s problem. We firstly
study the effect of modifyingw on NE{G(w)}. To establish a formal
notion of continuity of NE{G(w)} w.r.t w , we introduce essentiality:
Definition 4.6. Given metric space X, let Bα (x) ≜ {y ∈ X :
∥x −y∥ < α } denote the open ball with radius α > 0 around x ∈ X.
Then x ∈ NE{G(w)} is essential in w if for any ϵ > 0, ∃δ > 0 :
w ′ ∈ Bϵ (w) =⇒ x ′ ∈ Bδ (x), for any x ′ ∈ NE{G(w ′)}.
The following results establish the continuity in ID’s reward
under changes in w which underpin the existence of a solution for
ID’s problem and a method for computing the solution. We begin
by demonstrating that small changes in ID’s action lead to small
changes in the game, that is, the game itself is continuous in w .
PROPOSITION 4.7. NE{G(w)} is an essential set in w .
PROOF. We begin the proof by proving that the value function
for each agent i ∈ N is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. w:v(π⋆i ,π⋆−i ),wi (st ) −v(π⋆i ,π⋆−i ),w ′i (st ) = E[maxπ ∈Π[Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
+ γ
∑
s ′∈S
p(s ′ |s,a)v(π
⋆
i ,π
⋆
−i )
i (s ′,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
ut ∼ π (·|st )] 
− E[max
π ∈Π[Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w
′)
+ γ
∑
s ′∈S
P(s ′ |s,a)v(π
⋆
i ,π
⋆
−i )
i (s ′,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w ′)
ut ∼ π (·|st )] 
≤ max
π ∈Π
E [Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w) − Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w ′)ut ∼ π (·|st )] 
4
+ γ
∑
s ′∈S
P(s ′ |s,u)Eπ [v(π⋆i ,π⋆−i )i (s ′,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
−v(π
⋆
i ,π
⋆
−i )
i (s ′,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
ut ∼ π (·|st )]  (9)
Recall that γ < 1, we therefore find thatv(π⋆i ,π⋆−i ),wi (st ) −v(π⋆i ,π⋆−i ),w ′i (st )
≤ (1 − γ )−1max
π ∈Π
Eπ [Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
− Ri (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w ′)
ut ∼ π (·|st )]  ≤ c ∥w −w ′∥,
where c ≜ LR (1+γ )−1 and LR > 0 denotes the Lipschitz constant for
the function Ri , which proves that the function v
·,w
i is Lipschtzian
in w . Hence, a fortiori, the function v ·,wi is uniformly continuous
w.r.t. w hence we have that ∀ϵ > 0∃δ > 0 s.th ∥w −w ′∥ < ϵ =⇒
|v(π
⋆
i ,π
⋆
−i ),w
i (·) − v
(π⋆i ,π⋆−i ),w ′
i (·)| < δ . The remainder of the proof
follows thanks to the potential property in Definition 3 and Lemma
A.1. □
To solve the ID’s problem, it is necessary to establish the existence
of an optimal reward modifier w⋆ ∈W that solves ID’s problem,
i.e. w⋆ ∈W maximises J (w,π ) and thus induces an efficient NE.
THEOREM 4.8. For G(w) there exists a value w⋆ ∈ W that
maximises ID’s reward function RID.
SKETCH. First we note that by Prop. 4.3, we note that the func-
tion J is Lipschitz continuous w.r.t. the variable w .
The proof then follows from the compactness of Π,W and the
continuity of J , indeed since J is a continuous map from compact sets
by the properties of continuous maps we can deduce that the image
of J is compact. Moreover, by extreme value theorem we deduce the
existence of a maximum value of w within the setW . □
Previous results hold for an arbitrarily expressive modifier function
Θ. In practice, it is computationally efficient to express Θ using a
representation with few parameters. The following bounds ID’s loss
when Θ is approximated by a truncated power series:
THEOREM 4.9. Let wϵ (n) ∈ W approximate solution to ID’s
problem for G(w)which is generated by ann−order series expansion,
define ID’s approximation loss byL≜ J (w⋆,π )−J (wϵ (n),π ) , then
L is subject to the following bound:L ≤ max
w ′∈W ,π ′∈Π
DN+1 J (w ′,π (w ′)).
The solutionw⋆ is closely approximated by a truncated series expan-
sion (other expansions e.g. neural networks are possible) reducing
the number of parameters to be computed.
5 PRESERVING THE NASH EQUILIBRIA.
We can modify the framework to tackle the case in which the ID
modifies the rewards to maximise some efficiency criterion subject
to the condition that M-NE set of the game is preserved. Inducing
convergence to the highest welfare equilibria within a fixed M-NE
set is known as equilibrium selection (ES) and represents a major
challenge in GT and MARL [10].The ID framework can be used to
address ES within the context of MPGs.
Let µk (W ) ≜ {w ∈W : Ψ(·,w) = k |k ∈ R}. Since G(µk (W )) is
just the MG in which the agents’ rewards are modified by at most a
constant, it is straightforward to deduce that the NE set is preserved.
A particular case of this is potential-based reward shaping in which
each agent’s value function is given by the following:
vπ ,wi (s) = E
[ T∑
t=0
γ t−1i
{
γRi (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ) + F (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
}]
where F (st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w) := γiΘ(st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w)
− Θ(st−1,ui,t−1,u−i,t−1,w). When T = ∞, since 0 ≤ γi < 1 the
potential-based modifier produces the telescoping sum:∑
t ≥0 ∆Θ(st ,ui,t ,u−i,t ,w) = Θ(s0,ui,0,u−i,0,w) ≡ c where c is
some constant independent of the agents’ policies. We therefore
see that NE{G(w)} is preserved since from Definition 2, we can
see that the addition of constants to the agents’ reward functions
preserves the M-NE condition. The general case does not restrict to
potential based reward shaping. Moreover, unlike current potential-
based shaping methods for which the function F is fixed and may
lead to convergence to less desirable equilibria [6], now the function
F (·,w) is determined as a solution to the ID’s problem in w .
By similar reasoning as the method of the previous section, we
deduce that the following:
maximise
w ∈W ,π ∈Π
J (w,π ) s.t. ∇πΦπ ,µ0(W ) = 0, ∇2πΦπ ,µ0(W ) ⪯ 0. (10)
In this case, the M-NE constraint is defined over the M-NE set before
the ID alters the game. The formulation of the problem ensures
that the agents’ rewards are modified in a way that the agents play
efficient policies, the constraint ensures that the policy remains
within the original NE set. In order to formally describe the notion
of efficiency, we need the following concepts:
Definition 5.1. The strategy profile π ∈ Π is said to be a welfare
optimal strategy profile of G(w) if:∑i ∈Nvπ i ,π −i ,wi ≥ ∑i ∈Nvπ ′i ,π −i ,wi .
Definition 5.2. For a given w ∈ W , π ∈ Π is a said to be a
Pareto efficient (PE) strategy profile of G(w) if: i) vπ i ,π −i ,wi ≥
vπ
′i ,π ′−i ,w
i ,∀i ∈ N, ii) vπ
i ,π −i ,w
i > v
π ′i ,π −i ,w
i for an i ∈ N.
PE implies that no agent increases their reward whenever some other
strategy profile π ′ ∈ Π is played and, at least one agent is strictly
best off under π so that all agents prefer the PE outcome. PE is a
criterion for a welfare maximising ID. We say that strategy profile π
is payoff dominant if π ∈ NE{G(w)} and π is PE.
PROPOSITION 5.3. Let w ∈W be a solution to ID’s ES problem,
then ∃ π ∈ NE{G0} which is a payoff dominant policy profile of G0.
The issue of how to compute w⋆ remains; we now describe its
computation using black-box optimisation and MARL.
6 SOLUTION METHOD
The method uses MARL to generate a model of the strategic (equi-
librium) behaviour among the agents for a given value of wk that
determines the modification of the agents’ rewards. The value of
value of wk is then updated. The specifics are as follows: the func-
tion RID, its gradient, the function h and each v
π ,w
i are all unknown
to the ID (however a suitable proxy for the intrinsic reward, Ri is
known), who solely observes its realised rewards for each candidate
w which suggests a black-box optimisation method. The unknown
payoff, J , is treated as a random function with some prior belief
over the space of functions. After observing the value of J (wk ,π )
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for some wk ∈ W , the belief is updated to form a posterior dis-
tribution which is used to construct an acquisition function (e.g.,
expected improvement) that indicates which parameter wk+1 should
be evaluated next, guiding exploration overW . We use MARL to
solve the game G(w) allowing the agents (of the simulated game)
to observe only their individual (modified) rewards after their joint
policy π is played. The agents sample trajectories of experience
tuples (st ,ut , (Ri,w k (st ,ut ))i ∈N, st+1), which are used to estimate
the joint value function, vπ ,wi . Then, they update their policies by
performing stochastic gradient ascent.
The optimisation objective in (8) is nested; the ID chooses w of
G(w) and the agents select a joint policy which generates a reward
signal for the ID. Simultaneous updates of both the ID parameters
and the agents’ policies, in general, lack converge guarantees due to
non-stationarity. Therefore, in order to compute the solution itera-
tively, after an initial choice by the ID, we let the MARL algorithm
run until convergence which fulfils the M-NE constraint for the
ID’s problem (c.f. Prop. 6.1); the ID receives feedback from the
outcome of the game G(w), then updates its choice of w . This re-
sults in an inner-outer loop method. Each step performed by the
ID is computationally costly. As such, gradient-based algorithms
require a substantial number of iterations to converge to a solution.
We therefore use a sample-efficient optimisation algorithm, namely
Bayesian optimisation which also allows scaling of the framework.
BO also has strong theoretical guarantees for non-convex problems
[24] and can handle large dimensional problems [8, 30]. Inner-outer
loop methods are widely used in single agent problems to tune
hyperparameters of learning algorithms [14].
Inputs: Maximum number of BO evaluations K , and maximum
number of MARL iterations M .
1: Initialise ID’s dataset D0 = {} and reward modifier parameter
w0.
2: for k = 0, . . . ,K do
3: Initialise agents’ strategy profile π0.
4: form = 0, . . . ,M do
5: Agents sample data from the environment following
strategy profile πm .
6: Estimate joint value function (critic) vπm,w ki .
7: Update joint policy (actor) πm+1.
8: end for
9: Estimate ID’s payoff function J (wk ,πM ).
10: Select new wk+1 guided by current data Dk using BO with
expected improvement criterion.
11: Augment dataset Dk+1 = {Dk , (wk , J (wk ,πM ))}.
12: end for
13: Return wT .
Algorithm 1: The ID framework
6.1 Discussion on the method
Convergence. In order to ensure the algorithm converges to an opti-
mal solution for the ID both the inner and outer loop are required to
converge. Theorem 4.8 guarantees the existence of a solution forw⋆.
Convergence of the inner loop is required to obtain the equilibria of
the simulated MPG. Consequently, the method is subject to condi-
tions under which MARL methods converge. Hence, the method is
subject to conditions under which MARL methods converge. MARL
methods have been shown in general, to have strong convergence
guarantees to M-NE solutions for MPGs [11, 13, 29]. The following
proposition provides this guarantee:
PROPOSITION 6.1 (CONVERGENCE). Algorithm 1 converges
to a stable point, moreover the set of stable points of algorithm 1
correspond to M-NE for the MPG.
Another consideration is the growth in decision complexity of the
ID’s problem with the number of parameters over which the BO is
performed. This depends on the size of the state space of the MAS
model. Theorem 3, however proves that approximate solutions are
computable with fewer parameters for a given error bound.
7 EXPERIMENTS
7.1 Experiment 1: Optimising a Traffic Network
The following experiment illustrates the application of the method
to a traffic network problem. We consider road traffic network ex-
amples, one of which is a subsection of the city of London. In this
setting, each agent seeks to traverse the graph from a source node
(labelled 1) to a goal node (labelled 8) - this, for example can rep-
resent agents performing a commute. The agents incur costs which
represent the travel time. When traversing an edge, each agent incurs
a unit cost plus an additional cost which is a convex function of the
number of agents traversing the edge at that time - the latter cost
represents additional time delays due to traffic congestion.
The goal of each agent is to minimise its own costs. It is well-
known that in such systems (e.g. Braess’ Paradox, Pigou example),
the agents’ selfish behaviour of leads to congestion on ‘more desir-
able’ paths leading poor system efficiency [22].
The problem is modelled as a selfish routing game (SRG) - a
widely studied potential game [22] that models traffic networks.
In this setting, agents pursuing their individual objectives produce
outcomes that result in high travel times for all [31]. In this problem,
a set of N self-interested agents direct its commodity flow through
a network G = (V ,E) where V is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V ×V is
the set of edges of G. Each agent seeks to direct a single commodity
e.g., a taxi firm directing only its fleet. When traversing an edge their
commodity produces congestion incurring a negative externality
(cost) on all agents. Each agent’s commodity is infinitely divisible
so that at each node the agents may split their commodity flow over
each outgoing edge. Each agent’s goal is to direct its commodity
through paths that minimise its own costs.
A central planner (CP) seeks to minimise delays due to conges-
tion by devising a dynamic system of toll charges that induces an
even commodity flow over a given subset of edges of the network
Eˆ ⊆ E at all times. The CP’s problem is to maximise RID(w) =
−∑Tt=1[∑l ∈Eˆ (f ⋆(t) − fl (t))2]1/2 where fl (t ,w) is the flow on edge
l ∈ E at time t and f ⋆(t) ≜ (|Eˆ |)−1∑l ∈Eˆ fl (t). To induce changes
in the agents’ commodity flows, the CP adds to Ri,e the function
Θ(fe ) which is a power series of order 5.
We consider two cases, we firstly provide an intuitive example
known as Braess’ example, a widely studied problem that clearly
demonstrates the inefficiencies of traffic networks [22]. We then
apply the method to a subsection of the traffic network in the city of
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Figure 1: (Top) Braess’ example — all agents direct their com-
modity flow through the middle edge (3→ 2). (Bottom) The (dis-
tributed) commodity flows with the ID’s toll added.
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Figure 2: a) Network flow without ID. b) Network flow with
ID. Width of the edges represent the size of the flow produced
by the agents after converging to a Nash equilibrium with their
rewards modified by the ID. c) Comparison of social welfare
with iterations of agents’ MARL algorithm (inner loop of Algo-
rithm 1) without ID (red curve) and with ID (blue curve) after
K = 150 iterations of Bayesian optimisation. Without incentive,
the agents converge to an equilibrium that is mindless of the
social welfare, while the inclusion of the incentives leads to a
significant increase in social welfare.
London, UK. We show that our framework finds an optimal system
of tolls that leads to maximal system efficiency.
7.1.1 Braess’ Example. Fig. 1 shows a diagrammatic illus-
tration of the Nash equilibrium agent flow (the size of the flow of
agents through an edge is represented by the edge width) through
the network after convergence without ID. As is shown in Fig. 1a),
selfish agents play an M-NE strategy in which they route all their
commodity through the middle edge (3→ 2) leading to high conges-
tion costs. As is shown in Figs. 1a) and 1b), when an ID is included,
it learns how to set tolls (costs) on the middle edge that induce equal
flow over the graph which maximises social welfare.
Desired Default Induced
0 50 100 150 2000
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.
Figure 3: One shot case. (Top) Heat maps represent the ID’s
preferred distribution M⋆, the default agents’ behaviour, and
the agents’ distribution with modified rewards. (Bottom) Aver-
age KL divergences for each evaluation of the ID’s BO outer
loop (averaged over 100 independent tests per evaluation for 4
independent runs).
7.1.2 Extended City Case. We test our method in a complex
network consisting of 8 nodes and 13 edges which represents a
subsection of the London road network. We show that our method
produces socially optimal (M-NE) outcomes. The ID is able to iso-
late the 3 roads edges to apply tolls in only 150 outer loop iterations.
Our method shows that the ID was able to isolate three nodes
to apply a toll which led to a reduction in congestion (as indicated
in Fig. 2) through the network in only 150 iterations of BO (outer
loop). Fig. 2 c) shows the social welfare function (which is the sum
of all agents’ returns) after 6,000 iterations of the MARL algorithm
(inner loop) without the ID (orange curve) and with the ID (blue
curve), and demonstrates a significant increase in social welfare.
This technique is a first example of reinforcement learning in an
SRG that handles large networks and populations of users. This is in
contrast to current methods in which agents choose paths resulting
in exponential scaling in decision complexity with graph size [18].
7.2 Experiment 2: Supply & demand matching
with thousands of agents
Consider 2,000 agents each seeking to locate themselves at desir-
able points in space over some time horizon. The desirability of a
region changes with time and decreases with the number of agents
located within their neighbourhood. The resulting NE distribution
is in general, highly inefficient (and may not conform to external
objectives) due to agent clustering [15]. The problem is a dynamic
generalisation of the El Faro bar problem and encapsulates spec-
trum sharing problems in wireless communications [1]. The problem
also models spatio-economics problems such as firms locating their
supply with dynamic demand e.g. freelance taxis. To handle large
strategic populations, we use an mean field game framework [15].
A formal description is as follows: the game has a finite set of
agents N≜ {1, . . . ,N }, where N ∈ N. At time t < T , the state of
the system is xt = (xi,t )i ∈N ∈ Swhere xi,t denotes the location of
agent i at time t and S ⊆ R2. Each agent i selects action ui,t ∈ R2
which is a vector movement towards some location xi,t+1 ∈ S .
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The transition dynamics are given by xi,t+1 = αxi,t + βui,t + ϵi,t ,
where α , β are scalars, and ϵi,t ∼ N(0, Σ), for some covariance
matrix Σ. The agents’ joint action produces a distribution Mat+1 of
agents over S. Let maxt ∈ P(H) be the density of agents at some
location xt ∈ Sat time t ∈ [0,T ], where P(H) denotes the space of
probability measures. Each point in Shas some level of desirability
Γ : S× P(H) → R which is determined by the agent’s location and
the density of agents at that point. Each agent’s reward, Ri is given for
any π ∈ Π by: Ri (xt ,max ,ui ) = E
[ ∑T
t=0 Γ(xt ,max t ) − 12u⊤i,tKui,t
]
,
where Γ(xt ,max t ) := (xt − x˜t )2 − α(max t )2, where the expecta-
tion is taken over the state-action trajectory induced by the system
dynamics and joint policy π . The term, Ψ, rewards the agent for
locating closer to the point x˜t ∈ S at time t ≤ T whilst penalis-
ing the agent for remaining in areas with a large concentrations
agents. The quadratic term levies a movement penalty control cost.
A principal aims to incentivise the self-interested agents to adopt
a target distribution M⋆t at each time step t ≤ T . The principal’s
objective J is given by a KL divergence between Mat and M
⋆
t i.e.
J (w,π ) = E[∑Tt=0 KL(Mat (w,π )∥M⋆t )]. To incentivise the agents to
adopt its desired distribution, the principal adds a reward modifier
Θ - a function parameterised by w ∈W . We test our method both
one-shot dynamic scenarios.
In the one-shot game the ID seeks to induce an agent distribution
(shown by the left heat map in Fig. 3) - this differs from the distri-
bution obtained when agents’ maximise only their intrinsic reward
function (central heat map in Fig. 3). When the modifier function
Θ is added to the agents’ rewards, the average KL divergence con-
verges almost to zero which demonstrating a close match of the
agents’ distribution (right heat-map in Fig. 3) with the desired one.2
In the dynamic game the ID’s desired distribution changes over
time. In our experiment, M⋆t for t = 0, 1, 2 are as shown by the heat
maps in the top row of Fig. 4 (left), while the bottom row presents
the agents’ distributions achieved with the ID framework.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce an incentive designer (ID) framework - a
technique that enables self-interested adaptive learners to converge
to efficient Nash equilibria in Markov games. By adding a modi-
fier function to the agents’ rewards, our method learns to modify
the rewards of self-interested agents to induce efficient, desirable
equilibrium outcomes. We prove a continuity property in the ID’s
modifications to the game which permits a broad range of black-box
optimisation techniques to be applied.
9 APPENDIX
LEMMA A.1. Let A and B be sets and let f : A × B → R and
h : A×B→ R be two real-valued maps s.th. the following expression
holds ∀a ∈ A,b ∈ B and for some constant c:
| f (a,b) − h(a,b)| < c, (11)
It then follows that:
| max
a∈A,b ∈B
f (a,b) − max
a∈A,b ∈B
h(a,b)| < c
2The small discrepancy from 0 is due to the the Gaussian approximation of the agent
density.
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Figure 4: Dynamic case. (Top) Heat maps represent (first row)
the ID’s preferred distribution M⋆t , (second row) the induced
agent distribution Mat at time-steps t = 0, 1, 2. (Bottom) Average
episodic cumulative KL divergences for each evaluation of the
ID’s BO outer loop (averaged over 100 independent tests per
evaluation for 4 independent runs). Without the influence of the
ID, the agents behave similar to the default behaviour displayed
in Fig. 3-Top middle.
PROOF. By (11) we have thatf (a,b) < c +h(a,b). After applying
the max operator and taking absolute values we find:
max
a∈A,b ∈B
f (a,b) < c + max
a∈A,b ∈B
h(a,b)
=⇒ | max
a∈A,b ∈B
f (a,b) − max
a∈A,b ∈B
h(a,b)| < c
□
Proof of Proposition 4.3.
PROOF. To prove the proposition, we consider the two cases
(trajectory targeted and welfare targeted) of the MA’s goal separately.
Case I: Welfare Targeted
For the welfare targeted case, we firstly make the observation that
the agents’ reward functions Ri,w are Lipschitz continuous in w .
This follows from the fact that the composite function д1 ◦(д2 ◦(. . .◦
(дn (·) . . .)) of n < ∞ Lipschitzian functions д1,д2, . . . ,дn is itself
Lipschitzian (moreover we can then apply Rademacher’s lemma to
ascertain differentiability almost everywhere).
Specifically, we have for the function RID that
RID(w,h(v ·,w )) − RID(w ′,h(v ·,w
′)) ≤ (12)
LRID ∥w −w ′∥ +
(
h(v ·,w ) − (v ·,w ′)
)
≤ L′∥w −w ′∥
where L′ ≜ LRID +Lh and LRID and Lh are the Lipschitz constants of
RID and h, respectively. Since J (w,π ) ≜ E
[
RID(w,h(vπ ,wa ), ζ )
]
and
the function h is uniformly continuous, it follows J is expressible as
a composite function of uniformly continuous functions and hence is
itself uniformly continuous (since it is in fact Lipschitz continuous).
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To prove the remaining part of the proposition we consider now the
trajectory targeted case.
Case II: Trajectory Targeted
Let us now consider a sequence {wn } s.th. wn → w as n tends to
infinity, then there exists positive scalar values c and d, s.th.:
E
[ |J (w,Xπ (w )) − J (wn ,Xπ (wn ))|]
≤ c |w −wn | + d |Xπ (w ) − Xπ (wn ) |, (13)
where we have used the Lipschitzianity of J to deduce the inequality.
Since Xπ (wn ) → Xπ (w ) as n → ∞, then by (13) and by the dom-
inated convergence theorem we can deduce that ∃M ∈ N s.th. for
n ≥ M such that:
E
[
J (w,Xπ (w )) − J (wn ,Xπ (wn ))
]
< cδ
for some constants c > 0 and δ > 0 s.th δ → 0 as n →∞. □
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